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It is difficult to describe what takes place when we reflect on our thoughts, 
feelings, or actions without resorting to metaphor. “Detachment,” “getting outside of 
ourselves,” “taking a step back”—all of these expressions use the metaphor of distance 
to describe what happens when we relate to mental states in a way that differs from our 
initial experience of them. This dissertation aims to demonstrate that gaining 
psychological distance from ourselves and our thoughts can improve decision-making, 
strengthen emotion regulation, and, ultimately, increase well-being. Chapter 2 
demonstrates that self-distancing can reduce biased thought: Writing while using 
second- or third-person pronouns (e.g., “you,” “he,” or “she”) to refer to the self reduces 
the correspondence bias. Chapter 3 demonstrates that this same type of self-distanced 
writing can improve well-established cognitive behavioral therapy homework 
interventions, leading to increased life satisfaction. Chapter 4 demonstrates that self-
distanced writing can increase people’s assessments of their ability to cope with difficult 
situations. This program of research begins to demonstrate the depth and power of 
gaining psychological distance from the self. 
1 
 
Chapter 1: Getting Outside of Ourselves 
“I rightly think that the pursuit of detachment from our initial standpoint is an indispensable method of 
advancing our understanding of the world and of ourselves, increasing our freedom in thought and action, 
and becoming better. But since we are who we are, we can’t get outside of ourselves completely.”  
-Thomas Nagel, The View from Nowhere (1989, p.6, emphasis added) 
 
 
It is difficult to describe what takes place when we reflect on our thoughts, 
feelings, or actions without resorting to metaphor. “Detachment,” “getting outside of 
ourselves,” “taking a step back”—all of these expressions use the metaphor of distance 
to describe what happens when we relate to mental states in a way that differs from our 
initial experience of them. As the philosopher Thomas Nagel implicitly suggests in the 
above quote, in mental reflection we separate, detach, or distance one part of 
ourselves—our conscious awareness—from another part of ourselves—a thought, a 
feeling, or an experience as a whole. This dissertation aims to demonstrate that gaining 
psychological distance from the self when engaging in reflection can improve self-
insight, emotion regulation, decision-making, and, ultimately, overall well-being.  
 
Why self-distancing?  
Not all of our spontaneously occurring thoughts, feelings, and desires are 
accurate, good for us, or good for others around us (e.g., Kross & Mischel, 2010). 
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Despite our knowledge about the pernicious nature of many automatic thoughts and 
impulses, we often have difficulty controlling them (e.g., Kross & Mischel, 2010; 
Wegner, 1994). Our experience of our thoughts is immersive—it is quite difficult to step 
outside of them and recognize their interpretive and subjective nature.   
As a result of this immersive nature, our thoughts are highly compelling to us.  
They have an immediacy and power that is lacking when we hear the same thoughts 
expressed by someone else. Many of us have had the experience of having a worry 
nagging at us for days that would seem totally irrational if a friend came to us and 
recounted the very same worry. When the worry is not ours, we automatically have 
distance from the thought. 
However, we can simulate this experience of having “distance” on our own as well. 
Reflection as “the process or faculty by which the mind observes and examines its own 
experiences and emotions” (Oxford English Dictionary, 2011) is the natural language 
term for the process of attempting to gain psychological distance from one of our own 
thoughts or desires in order to observe it – thus the phrase “take a step back and reflect.” A 
thinker must create “mental space” between the self and the thought or desire to be 
observed.   
The word “reflection” itself is based on a metaphor that requires space or 
distance between one object and a second object (e.g., a mirror) that has the capacity to 
bounce light back in such a way that a representation of the first object appears. For 
example, if I were to stand across from a mirror, then I would see a reflection of myself 
and be able to observe my own appearance. However this effect and this relation 
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necessitate distance. If I were to—in some way—be on the same spatial level as the 
mirror, no reflection would occur. If I were to stand half an inch from the mirror, I may 
be able to see a reflection, but it would not be a reflection that would tell me much about 
what I was seeing. It is only when I move back and gain distance from the reflective 
surface that I can fully see my own reflection. 
In the same way, if I were to reflect on a train of thought, I cannot 
simultaneously be “immersed in” that train of thought. This represents the difference 
between thinking “Julie is an awful person,” and “Right now I am thinking that Julie is 
an awful person.” The difference between these two thoughts is difficult to describe, and 
thus we resort to the metaphor of physical reflection and distance.  
This process of successfully breaking out of a default state of “immersion” in 
one’s thoughts and gaining psychological distance from the self has been called “self-
distancing” (e.g., Kross & Ayduk, 2011). Distance from the self has been generated in 
two distinct ways: a) instructing people to take the perspective of a “fly on the wall” 
when reflecting on a past experience—in other words to take a third-person or observer’s 
perspective of the situation (e.g., Ayduk & Kross, 2008), or b) to think or write while 
referring to oneself as one would typically refer to another person—in other words, to 
refer to oneself in the second- (e.g., “you”) or third person (e.g., “he” or “she”; e.g., 
Kross et al., under review).  
Self-distancing—i.e., the process of taking a step back from one’s own thoughts 
and looking at one’s thoughts and experiences as if one were an “other,”—has 
previously been shown to distinguish productive reflection from counterproductive 
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rumination (for a review, see Kross & Ayduk, 2011). Building on these findings, my 
dissertation examines the role that this process plays in three contexts: (a) Facilitating 
the correction of cognitive biases, (b) demonstrating that self-distancing can improve a 
well-established cognitive behavioral therapy intervention, and (c) changing the balance 
of challenge versus threat appraisals of problematic situations. 
 
Self-Distancing as a general technique to correct cognitive biases 
Since the 1970s, manifold biases in human thought have been uncovered (for a 
review, see Kahneman & Tversky, 2000). These often involve an initial, automatic 
response that can be corrected with appropriate knowledge and/or an appropriate amount 
of reflection. Notably absent from the literature are general techniques that successfully 
correct a wide range of biases (e.g., Larrick, 2004; Yates et al., 2003). Many debiasing 
techniques such as instructing people to think harder, offering them incentives, or 
increasing social accountability are successful with some biases but can exacerbate 
others (Larrick, 2004; Lerner & Tetlock, 1999)  
On the other hand, both conventional wisdom and experimental evidence suggest 
that people are better at recognizing bias in others than in themselves (Kruger & 
Gilovich, 1999; Wilson & Brekke, 1994). Recognizing the irrationality of a friend’s 
worry, as mentioned above, is but one example of a pervasive asymmetry in human 
recognition of mental mistakes. Thus, to the extent that a person can think of themselves 
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as if they were an “other”—i.e., adopt a self-distanced perspective—they should also 
make more accurate judgments.  
I tested this prediction in two experiments by examining whether self-distancing 
reduces the correspondence bias (also known as the fundamental attribution error; 
Bremner, Kross, & Goldberg, under review). The correspondence bias refers to the 
finding that in many situations people tend to reach unjustified conclusions about the 
dispositions or personality of another person when situational constraints are the most 
appropriate explanation for their behavior (e.g., Gilbert & Malone, 1995; Jones & Harris, 
1967). This tendency has been shown to be very robust in the face of numerous factors, 
including even explicit warnings of judgmental bias (Croxton & Miller, 1987; for a 
review, see Gawronski, 2004). These two experiments will be the subject of Chapter 2. 
 
Self-Distancing can improve CBT interventions 
Although the treatment of affective disorders may seem far removed from 
eliminating cognitive biases, the two are closely related. Cognitive Behavioral Therapy 
(CBT) is by far the most common and effective treatment for affective disorders. The 
“cognitive” in its title reflects the idea that irrational thoughts (another word for biases) 
can cause emotional disorders. If self-distancing attenuates biases that are easier for 
outsiders to see (as demonstrated in Chapter 2), then it may also reduce those cognitive 
biases that are in part responsible for the generation and maintenance of disorders such 
as generalized anxiety disorder (GAD). People with GAD overemphasize the dangers or 
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threats inherent in everyday life and respond to a wide range of life situations with 
anxiety. Self-distancing may help people see these dangers with greater objectivity. 
More generally, self-distancing has been shown to help people adaptively reflect 
on problematic situations and exhibit less emotional reactivity when considering those 
situations (Kross & Ayduk, 2011). For both of these reasons self-distancing should be a 
helpful adjunct to CBT interventions. 
As mentioned above, my colleagues and I have developed a means of creating 
distance from the self by instructing participants to either think or write in the second- 
(i.e., “you”) or third person (i.e., “he” or “she”). For example, imagine a stressed 
undergraduate named Joe who is approaching a deadline on a term paper. If Joe wanted 
to write about his anxiety in the third person, then instead of writing “I am really 
worried…I think I’m never going to finish this,” he would write, “Joe is really 
worried…he thinks he is never going to finish this.”  
CBT already makes extensive use of written exercises such as worry episode logs 
for GAD that are completed in the first person; these provide an ideal opportunity to test 
my hypothesis that self-distancing via third-person writing could be a substantial help to 
people engaging in such written exercises. If self-distanced writing allows people to 
engage in more accurate assessments of threats, and/or reflect on threats with less 
accompanying emotional intensity, it may offer substantial benefits over and above the 
previously demonstrated efficacy of standard CBT interventions. A longitudinal 




Self-Distancing can change interpretations of threat and challenge 
A follow-up study was completed to explore in greater detail what may have 
caused the effects observed in Chapter 3. By its nature, the brief responses called for by 
the format of the worry episode log used in Chapter 3 rendered the responses difficult to 
code. For that reason I completed a separate study in which participants wrote in a free-
form manner for as long as they desired about an ongoing source of worry. Based on the 
encouraging results of Chapter 3, I thought that one cognition that might be targeted 
through self-distanced writing is the balance of threat versus challenge appraisals when 
facing difficult situations. Drawing on the work on challenge and threat appraisals by 
Lazarus, Blascovich, and others, I posited that people writing in a self-distanced fashion 
would interpret ongoing problems in their lives as less of a threat and more of a 
challenge for two reasons.  
First, through self-distancing, people focus less on the concrete and emotionally 
arousing aspects of a difficult situation, and instead concentrate more on reconstruing 
experiences so that they can better “work through” their feelings (Kross & Ayduk, 
2011). In difficult situations, it is likely that the concrete, emotionally arousing elements 
of that situation are what make it more likely that someone will believe that the demands 
of the situation outweigh his or her ability to cope. Because people focus less on such 
details when they self-distance, I predict that self distancing will make people less likely 
to view a given situation as a threat, and more likely to view that situation as a challenge. 
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Second, I make the argument that perceptions of danger that developed through 
the course of human evolution result in irrationally high assessments of threat in a 
modern industrialized society. Because Chapter 2 will demonstrate that self-distancing 
decreases bias, I reasoned that, even for nonclinical samples, taking a self-distanced, 
outsider’s perspective should result in less biased perceptions of threat and increased 
perceptions of challenge in problematic situations. A change in the balance of threat 
versus challenge appraisals may also hint at the mechanism for the results of Chapter 3.  
 There is clearly more to be done by building on the findings presented in this 
dissertation. The final chapter outlines several future directions for research on the 
process and consequences of gaining psychological distance from the self. 
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  Chapter 2: Self-Distancing and the Reduction of 
Cognitive Bias 
"Why do you see the speck that is in your brother's eye, but do not notice the log that is in your 
own eye?” – Jesus, Luke 6:41  
 
“…it is much easier, as well as far more enjoyable, to identify and label the mistakes of others 
than to recognize our own.” – Daniel Kahneman (2011, p. 3) 
 
People are much better at recognizing bias in others than in themselves (Kruger 
& Gilovich, 1999; Wilson & Brekke, 1994). Our own thoughts are highly compelling to 
us. We (incorrectly) believe that they are an accurate, unfiltered representation of the 
external world. This “naïve realism” is a serious impediment to correcting biased 
thinking (Ross & Ward, 1996).  
What if the compelling nature of our thoughts could be reduced by gaining 
distance from them? This is not a radical idea. Forty years ago, Beck (1970) described 
“distancing” as a process that allows clients to “gain objectivity towards [their] 
cognitions” and cope with distress. Numerous studies have supported this hypothesis by 
demonstrating that cueing people to reflect on distressing experiences from a self-
distanced perspective—i.e., visualizing a negative experience from a “fly on the wall” 
perspective, in which the self becomes an observer of his or her experience—facilitates 
emotion regulation (for a review, see Kross & Ayduk, 2011).  
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But what if emotion regulation is not the ultimate goal? A major problem in 
social perception is the correspondence bias—the tendency to erroneously attribute the 
causes of people’s behavior to their personalities and attitudes rather than the situation 
(also termed the fundamental attribution error; cf. Gawronski, 2004; Gilbert & Malone, 
1995; Jones & Harris, 1967; Ross, 1977). When focusing on a behavior, inferences about 
dispositions follow three steps: behavior categorization, dispositional characterization, 
and situational correction. The first two have been demonstrated to be relatively 
automatic (for a review, see Uleman, Newman, & Moskowitz, 1996) whereas situational 
correction is often more conscious and controlled (Gilbert, Krull, & Pelham, 1988; 
Gilbert, Pelham, & Krull, 1988; Gilbert, 1989) 
One could argue then that dispositional inference is part and parcel of naïve 
realism – initially behaviors often appear to us as if they have been caused by 
dispositions. Subsequently, if we are motivated and have the cognitive capacity, we can 
correct this initial inference by realizing that our initial view of the world was incorrect. 
This “breaking through” naïve realism is precisely what I expect self-distancing to 
support.  
I expect this for the same reason that a given person, let’s call her the “observer” 
is better able to see bias in others than in herself: She has distance from any given 
“other’s” experience—the initial impressions or thoughts of the other are not compelling 
to her in the same way as they are to the other. By definition she is freed from the other’s 
naïve realism which is generated by the other’s automatic thoughts about and 
impressions of the world. This, of course, is not to say that the subject does not have her 
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own naïve realism to contend with, instead it is simply to say that she is not bound by the 
other’s naïve realism. This is far easier to illustrate using a concrete example.  
Let’s say that a man exists named George who is a recovering racist. Negative 
automatic thoughts about minorities are part of the naïve realism of George’s experience 
of the world, but he consciously no longer wants them to be. In this example, George 
will be the “other” and George’s friend, Simon, who does not suffer from such automatic 
prejudicial thoughts, will be the “observer” of George. One day George meets Simon for 
lunch and their server is a member of a disadvantaged minority group. George makes the 
comment to Simon that he hopes the server doesn’t spit in their food. The server was 
perfectly pleasant and Simon is fairly confident that there is no reason for George to 
have this suspicion apart from the automatic prejudicial thoughts that George 
unfortunately continues to have. However, it is difficult for George to realize this. To 
George, the server simply seemed to him like someone who might spit in his food. In 
general, people are bad at understanding why they have the thoughts that they have 
(Nisbett & Wilson, 1977), and when the world appears to them to be a certain way, 
people almost always assume that the world is that way. In fact, it seems to require 
“taking a step back” from one’s thoughts to call them into question.  
Once this distance appears between the thinker and the thought, it is easier to call 
the thought into question. However, in the very moment that George is thinking that the 
server might spit in his food, it is impossible for him to call this into question. In other 
words, George has to first have the thought in order to be able to doubt it. George has to 
think to himself “Hey, I’m thinking that this server might spit my food.” This changes 
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the train of thought in which he was currently engaged into the object of his thinking. 
George is now engaging in metacognition, in other words, treating one of his own 
thoughts as an object of his thinking.  
The best way that humans have found to describe this process is to evoke the 
metaphor of distance. In this case the subject who is having the thoughts has to be 
divorced or distanced from the object, the thought itself. The more one is able to 
dispassionately look at the thought, in other words, to look at the thought without the 
attachment that comes from thinking the world is exactly as it initially appears, the better 
one is able to critically examine the thought itself. If George, with some prompting from 
Simon, takes a step back from his judgment and thinks about why he might have made 
the judgment about the server, he may be able to recognize his own bias, but only if he is 
not immersed in the train of thought, only if he is not too attached to the thought. In 
short, I believe that gaining “distance” from one’s thoughts will better allow people to 
realize mistakes that they are making in thinking, in other words, will better allow 
people to recognize their own cognitive biases.  
So, given the above, in this line of research I ask the question: Might self-
distancing, by allowing people to reflect on the self as an “other,” reduce the 
correspondence bias? I ask this not because of anything particular to the correspondence 
bias, but simply because the correspondence bias is an important example of a mental 




It is important to note that in this experiment I did not ask participants to take the 
perspective of the target—a manipulation that has been shown to increase the salience of 
situational information and, thus, decrease dispositional judgments when participants 
make judgments about situational versus dispositional causes of behavior (Storms, 
1973). Rather, I asked people to take a step back from their own thoughts and view 
themselves as an “other,” thus (I posit) increasing their ability to think about possible 
mistakes that they have might have made in their initial judgment (e.g., in the case of 
this experiment, “Well, this person was a participant in experiment and she was 
instructed to write a pro-Obama essay, so maybe the essay isn’t that representative of her 
actual opinion”). This distinction is noteworthy because the perspective-taking 
manipulation used by Storms is likely not generalizable to other types of biases, many of 
which do not hinge on taking the perspective of the target of the judgment. In contrast, a 
priori, I expect the debiasing technique explored here to work on any bias that is easier 
for an outsider to notice.  
I tested this prediction in two studies using the attitude attribution paradigm 
(Jones & Harris, 1967). In this paradigm, participants are given an essay that is written 
by a participant in a separate study. They are then asked to rate the author’s attitude on 
the subject of the essay—in the present case, United States President Barack Obama. To 
elicit the correspondence bias, participants are told that the essay’s author was instructed 
to write a pro-Obama essay prior to making their rating. This information is meant to 
decrease the value of the content of the essay when making a judgment about the target’s 
actual attitude. The correspondence bias is so named because participants tend to infer 
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an attitude that corresponds to the content of the essay even when the position of the 
essay is assigned and such an inference is unwarranted. This tendency is robust, and 
resistant to a host of factors, including explicit warnings of judgmental bias (Croxton & 
Miller, 1987; for a review, see Gawronski, 2004).  
In the current studies, I examined whether cueing people to adopt a self-distanced 
perspective would attenuate the correspondence bias. Specifically, I examined whether 
asking people to refer to themselves as they would typically refer to other people—i.e., 
in the second person (“you”) or third person (“he” or “she”) instead of the first person 
(“I”)
1




 Experiment 1 examined whether self-distancing reduces the correspondence bias. 
Participants were given an essay supporting Barack Obama that was written by a 
previous participant. They were told that the essay’s author was instructed to take a pro-
Obama position. After participants read the essay, they were asked to rate the author’s 
“actual attitude” about Obama. Before making this rating, however, I randomly assigned 
participants to one of four groups.  
                                               
1 Prior research indicates that using second- and third-person pronouns to refer to the self 
promotes self-distancing (Kross et al., 2012). 
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Participants in the self-distanced group were asked to write about their thoughts 
about the author’s opinion in the third person (i.e., using “he” or “she” and their own 
first name to refer to the self).  
Participants in the first-person group were asked to write about their thoughts 
about the author’s opinion in the first person (i.e., using “I” to refer to the self). This 
condition was included to ensure that merely instructing people to use a specific pronoun 
to refer to the self would not affect judgment.  
Participants in the no pronoun instructions group were told to write about their 
thoughts about the author’s opinion; they were not told to use certain types of pronouns. 
This condition was included to ensure that writing without instructions about how to 
refer to the self would not affect judgment.  
Finally, participants in the no-writing group were asked to rate the author’s 
attitude after reading the essay without receiving additional instructions. This condition 
was included to replicate the original demonstration of the correspondence bias.  
I tested three hypotheses. First, I predicted that self-distanced participants would 
exhibit less bias. That is, they should rate the author’s attitude as less pro-Obama 
compared to the three other groups. Second, I predicted that the three other conditions 
would not differ from each other on the grounds that each involves having people think 
in the first person, which should maintain immersion in one’s own thoughts (and thus 
naïve realism). Finally, I did not expect the debiasing effects of self-distancing to be 
driven by the (potential) difficulty associated with implementing the self-distancing 
instructions. Several recent studies indicate that the psychological experience of 
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difficulty (i.e., “disfluency”) can lead to debiasing (for a review, see Schwarz, 2012). To 
rule out the possibility that mere difficulty of writing in the third person would be 
responsible for any difference between conditions (rather than the fact that self-
distancing allows people to think about themselves as if they were an “other”), I asked 
participants in each of the writing conditions to rate how difficult it was to write in the 
way that I requested after they rated the author’s actual attitude about Obama.  
Methods 
Participants. Participants were 137 “workers” (84 women; Mage = 30.4) on 
Amazon's Mechanical Turk, a “crowdsourcing” platform through which people complete 
tasks for compensation.  
Cover story. Participants were recruited for a study on human reasoning. 
Experimental manipulations. Participants in the self-distanced [first-person] 
group were told, “We are interested in learning about the different ways people think. 
Some people report thinking to themselves in the third person [first person] (in other 
words, using the pronouns “he” or “she” and using their own names [using the pronoun 
“I”] when thinking about themselves) when engaging in certain activities, so this is one 
type of thought that we are interested in examining. For example, when a person with the 
name John is doing something, he might think: ‘John is thinking that... He is feeling...’ 
[when doing something, someone might think: “I think that... I feel...’].”  
On the next page participants were told, “In a moment we are going to ask you to 
rate the writer of the Obama essay on his or her actual position toward Obama. But first, 
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in order to investigate the effects of this third-person [first-person] thought on the 
current task, we would like you to write in the third person [first person] about what you 
are currently thinking and feeling about the writer of the Obama essay for the next few 
minutes. Please make sure to include your thoughts about your rating of his or her 
position toward Obama. Use the third person pronouns “he” or “she” as well as your 
own name [use the first person pronoun “I”] as much as possible as you try to 
understand the thoughts and emotions you are currently experiencing. Why are you 
having the thoughts that you are having? What underlying causes might exist for your 
current thoughts and feelings?” 
Participants in the no pronoun instructions condition were told, “We are 
interested in learning about the different ways people think. In a moment we are going to 
ask you to rate the writer of the essay on his/her actual position on Obama. But first, we 
would like you to write about what you are currently thinking and feeling about the 
writer of the Obama essay for the next few minutes. Please make sure to include your 
thoughts about your rating of his or her position toward Obama. Try to understand the 
thoughts and emotions you are currently experiencing. Why are you having the thoughts 
that you are having? What underlying causes might exist for your current thoughts and 
feelings?” 
Participants in the no writing group were asked to rate the writer of the essay 
after reading the essay. 
18 
 
Author Rating. Participants were instructed to “Please rate the writer of this 
essay on his/her actual position on Obama” on a 9-point scale (-4 = anti-Obama, 4 = 
pro-Obama; M = 2.54, SD = 1.70)  
Perceived difficulty of writing instructions. Participants were asked, “How 
difficult did you find it to follow the instructions about the way to write the essay?” on a 
7-point scale (1= very difficult, 7 = very easy; M = 4.73, SD = 1.78).  
Instructional manipulation check (IMC). I included a “trap question” to 
determine whether participants read our instructions. Specifically, participants read, 
“…We are interested in whether you actually take the time to read the directions…In 
order to demonstrate that you have read these instructions, please select cricket and 
badminton below and no other answer choices…” Participants were then presented with 
a series of sport choices with badminton and cricket embedded among them.  
Results 
Preliminary analyses. The second response of one participant who took the 
survey twice was excluded. Twenty-six participants were excluded because they failed 
the IMC. Exclusion rates based on the IMC were consistent with rates found in previous 
studies (Oppenheimer, Meyvis, & Davidenko, 2009). Two participants did not follow 
protocol and were excluded. Results remain significant when participants who did not 
follow protocol are included. 
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There were no interactions between the results presented below and age, gender, 
education, income, political orientation, political party identification, or interest in 
politics (ps > .18). Controlling for these variables did not influence the results.  
Primary analyses. As expected, using planned contrasts as described in my 
hypotheses, participants in the self-distanced group (M = 1.63, SD = 2.18) rated the 
author’s attitude as less pro-Obama than the other groups (M = 2.80, SD = 1.44; t(102) = 
3.09, p = .003, d = 1.07). There were no differences between the no-writing group (M = 
3.07, SD = .65), the first-person writing group (M = 2.96, SD = 1.34), and the no 
pronoun instructions writing group (M = 2.35, SD = 2.02; ts < 1.64 , ps > .1).  
Participants in the self-distanced group (M = 4.04, SD = 1.94) reported more 
difficulty following instructions about how to write than the two control writing groups 
(M = 5.04, SD = 1.63; t(74) = 2.33, p = .02)
2
. Critically however, difficulty writing in the 
manner requested did not predict attitude ratings (t(73) = 0.94, p = . 35). Using Hayes’ 
PROCESS module (2013)  it was determined that difficulty did not interact with 
condition  t(73) = 1.39, p = .17) to predict participants’ judgments of the author’s 
attitude towards Obama and controlling for this variable did not influence the results, 
suggesting that mere difficulty associated with writing in the third person is not 
                                               
2 Degrees of freedom have changed because only participants in the three writing 
conditions were asked how difficult it was to write in the manner requested. Therefore 
only these three conditions are taken into account in this analysis. 
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responsible for any differences between conditions. However, a nonsignificant 
interaction pattern existed, depicted here for purposes of completeness (Figure 1).  
 
Fig. 1. Effects of third-person writing compared to control writing at high (1 SD above 
the mean) and low (1 SD below the mean) levels of difficulty 
 
  
Additional exploratory analyses demonstrated that in the first-person instructions 
condition, self-reported difficulty correlated positively with attitude ratings, r(25) = .390, 
p = .045, such that as people found the writing task more difficult, attitude ratings 
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became less biased (i.e., less pro-Obama). In the third-person instructions condition, 
there was a marginal negative correlation between difficulty and attitude ratings, r(22) = 
-.375, p = .071, such that as people found the writing task more difficult, attitude ratings 
became more biased (i.e., more pro-Obama). There was no correlation between difficulty 
and attitude ratings in the no pronoun instructions group, r(24) = -.129, p = .531. 
However, it should be emphasized that the correlations reported here are highly 
exploratory in nature and reported only for the sake of completeness. 
 
Experiment 2 
Experiment 2 had two goals. First, I sought to directly replicate the debiasing 
effect I observed in Experiment 1 with a larger and more diverse sample. To this end, I 
included lab participants and Mechanical Turk workers to ensure that these results 
generalize beyond an online sample.  
Second, I was interested in refining our understanding of the role that pronoun 
use plays in debiasing. In Experiment 1, I manipulated self-distancing via third-person 
writing. However, the second person (i.e., “you”), like the third person, is used to refer 
to people other than the self. Thus, like the third person, it should promote self-
distancing when used to refer to the self. This condition sheds light on whether the 
construct “self-distancing” is the cause of the debiasing effect as opposed to, say, 
something idiosyncratic about writing in the third person. In the past, self-distancing 
studies have not differentiated between the second- and third person, instead instructing 
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people to write using “non-first-person pronouns” (cf. Kross, et al., under review) 
Therefore, although I expected third- and second-person writing to have equivalent 
effects, the possibility existed that a linear effect of distancing would appear, such that 
third-person writing would generate more distance from one’s thoughts than would 
second-person writing, which in turn would generate more distance from one’s thoughts 
than first-person writing or no writing. While admitting this possibility, I expected 
participants in the self-distanced conditions (second- and third-person writing) not to 
differ from each other and to exhibit reduced bias compared to the first-person writing- 
and no writing groups. Consistent with Experiment 1, I expected the latter groups not to 
differ.  
I addressed these issues by randomly assigning people to one of four conditions: 
third-person writing, second-person writing, first-person writing, or no writing. Having 
established in Experiment 1 that the no pronoun instructions writing condition did not 
differ from the first-person writing condition, I chose not to include the no pronoun 
instructions condition in this study. With the exception of the aforementioned changes, 
the design of Experiment 2 was identical to Experiment 1. 
Methods 
Participants. Participants were 407 “workers” (237 women; Mage = 33.8) on 
Amazon's Mechanical Turk and 142 (94 women; Mage = 20.2) paid lab participants.  
Design 
Cover story. See Experiment 1. 
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Experimental manipulations. The instructions for no writing, first-person 
writing, and third-person writing groups were identical to Experiment 1. The second-
person instructions mirrored the third-person instructions except references to third-
person pronouns were replaced by references to the second-person pronoun “you.”   
Author Rating. See Experiment 1 (M = 2.39, SD = 1.76). 
Rating of difficulty of writing instructions. See Experiment 1 (M = 4.53, SD = 
1.65).  
IMC. See Experiment 1. 
Results 
Preliminary analyses. The second responses of seven participants who took the 
survey twice were excluded. Eighty-nine participants failed the IMC and were excluded. 
Exclusion rates based on the IMC were consistent with rates found in previous studies 
(Oppenheimer et al., 2009). Thirty participants did not follow protocol and were 
excluded. The results presented below in the primary analyses remain significant when 
participants who did not follow protocol are included. 
The results presented in the primary analyses below did not interact with Sample 
(Mechanical Turk vs. Laboratory participants), age, gender, education, income, political 
orientation, political party identification, or interest in politics (ps > .1). Controlling for 
these variables did not influence the results. 
Primary analyses. As expected, I observed no differences between the second-
person and third-person writing groups, t(420) = 0.28, p = .777, or between the no 
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writing and first-person writing groups, t(420) = 0.01, p = .997. Critically, as Figure 2 
illustrates, the two self-distanced groups rated the author’s attitude as less pro-Obama 
compared to the two control groups, t(420) = 2.91, p = .004, d = .29.  
 
Fig. 2. Self-Distancing reduces the correspondence bias. Ratings closer to zero represent 




Using Hayes’ PROCESS module (2013) it was determined that difficulty did not 
interact with condition, t(300) = 0.61, p = .541, to predict participants’ judgments of the 
author’s attitude towards Obama and controlling for this variable did not influence the 
results, suggesting that mere difficulty associated with writing in the second- or third 
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person is not responsible for any differences between conditions. Additionally, the 
nonsignificant pattern observed in Experiment 1 did not exist in Experiment 2 (see figure 
3). 
Fig. 3. Effects of second- and third-person writing compared to control writing at high (1 
SD above the mean) and low (1 SD below the mean) levels of difficulty. 
 
 
Additional exploratory analyses demonstrated that within the first-person 
instructions writing condition difficulty did not correlate with attitude ratings, r(113) = 
.043, p = .649, within the second-person writing condition difficulty did not correlate 
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with attitude ratings, r(81) = .137, p = .222, and within the third-person writing 
condition difficulty did not correlate with attitude ratings, r(81) = -.138, p = .153.  
Discussion 
In The View from Nowhere, one of the most influential works of 20
th
 century 
philosophy, Nagel (1989) claimed that, “the pursuit of detachment from [one’s] initial 
standpoint is an indispensable method of advancing [one’s] understanding of the world,” 
but added, “since we are who we are, we can’t get outside of ourselves completely” (p. 
6). Although this may be true, the current results suggest that self-distancing—a process 
that allows people to “step back” from themselves and their initial view of the world—
can indeed advance people’s understanding of the world, helping them engage in less 
error-ridden social reasoning. In this vein, I found in two experiments that cueing people 
to think about the self using second- and third-person pronouns—parts of speech that 
promote self-distancing (Kross et al., 2012)—attenuated the correspondence bias. Future 
research is needed to establish what extent these findings generalize to other biases.  
A brief note is called for on the differences in effect size between the two 
experiments. Experiment 2 had much greater power and thus, I believe that the effect 
size of Experiment 2 to be closer to the true effect size.  
Across both studies, self-reported difficulty of writing in the manner requested 
did not predict attitude ratings. Thus, it is unlikely that a disfluency explanation can be 
given for the debiasing effect of self-distancing. Additionally, it might be thought that 
people will only believe the results of their self-distanced judgment when they perceive 
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the process of self-distancing to be sufficiently easy, or, in other words, people may 
doubt the results of their self-distanced judgment when they perceive the act of self-
distancing to be difficult (e.g., Schwarz, 2012). However, although the nonsignificant 
interaction pattern and correlations provided some exploratory support for this 
proposition in Experiment 1, these hints were not replicated in Experiment 2, which had 
much greater power. Fluency may play a role in the process of looking at oneself from 
the outside, but from these data it is unclear what that may be. 
However, further experimentation should be undertaken to rule out fluency as a 
mechanism. One possibility would be to create an experimental situation in which 
participants would practice writing in the second- or third person a number of times 
before actually engaging in writing about the judgment task. If mere difficulty is driving 
this effect, then as second- and third-person writing becomes easier as a result of 
practice, the debiasing effect of self-distancing should decrease. However, this is a 
complicated discussion because one aspect of the difference between our experience of 
our own thoughts and our experience of thinking about others’ thoughts is the fact that 
our thoughts are fluent to us. The disfluency of thinking about someone else’s thoughts, 
or of thinking about one’s own thoughts from a self-distanced perspective might be part 
and parcel of the way in which self-distancing works. The potentially complicated role 
of fluency should be engaged in future research. 
In addition to having implications for debiasing, these findings extend research 
on psychological distancing more generally. They suggest that gaining distance from the 
self is a process that differs in some ways from gaining distance from objects other than 
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the self. For example, using the same attitude attribution paradigm that I used in these 
experiments, Nussbaum, Trope, and Liberman (2003) found that asking participants to 
make judgments about a target person’s behavior in the distant future (compared to the 
near future) enhanced the correspondence bias. In contrast, the present studies 
demonstrate that gaining distance from the self reduces the correspondence bias. The 
discrepancy between these findings highlights the need for future research to directly 
examine the effects of distancing from the self versus distancing from others. 
Concluding Comment 
Although we humans are better at recognizing bias in others than in ourselves, 
we also possess the ability to self-distance. These findings demonstrate that this capacity 
improves error-prone judgments by allowing people to “step back” from the immediacy 




Chapter 3: Self-Distancing Can Improve Existing 
Evidence-Based Therapeutic Interventions 
 
Human history is replete with accounts of the benefits of writing down one’s 
thoughts, from the age-old practice of keeping a diary or journaling, to the more 
structured written exercises of groups such as Alcoholics Anonymous (Smith & Wilson, 
2013). In the scientific literature, the benefits of writing about intrusive thoughts have 
also been demonstrated repeatedly (e.g., Pennebaker, 1997). For that reason it is not 
surprising that through the years, written homework exercises have been integrated into 
cognitive behavioral therapy (CBT) in order to help clients process their thoughts and 
emotions (e.g., Craske & Barlow, 2006; Rygh & Sanderson, 2004). 
Written homework exercises are used in virtually every instantiation of CBT 
treatment, including treatment for generalized anxiety disorder (GAD). Homework 
exercises allow clients to practice what they have learned in therapy, to challenge their 
biased ways of thinking about themselves and the world, and to increase their self-
awareness (e.g., Freeman, 2007).  
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I argue that the function of all of these helpful practices of writing can be 
accentuated through self-distancing. This particular experiment focuses on a CBT 
intervention for anxiety, but the current findings should apply to other forms of written 
emotion- and thought-processing as well. I expect self-distancing to increase the 
effectiveness of writing practices for two reasons. 
First, when people analyze their feelings from a self-distanced perspective, they 
report less distress than people who adopt a self-immersed perspective (Ayduk & Kross, 
2008; Ayduk & Kross, 2009; Kross, Ayduk, & Mischel, 2005). Across both sad and 
angry experiences, participants who self-distance when thinking about these experiences 
recount their experience to a lesser degree than those who adopt an immersed 
perspective, and self-distanced participants reconstrue their experiences more than 
immersed participants. This reduction of distress and facilitation of meaning-making 
associated with self-distancing should be particularly helpful when addressing ongoing 
worrisome concerns. 
Secondly, self-distancing may help people reason about worries more accurately 
and adaptively. The previous chapter demonstrated that self-distancing can reduce the 
correspondence bias. Cognitive biases such as the correspondence bias are not the first 
things that come to mind when one thinks of disorders of the emotions such as Major 
Depressive Disorder (MDD) and GAD. However, since its founding, one of the 
assumptions of CBT has been that these illnesses are based in part on problematic 
cognitions, or biases. One example of such a bias is overgeneralization. This tendency 
occurs when someone takes a single event (e.g., a classmate saying “you’re a loser”) to 
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be representative of an unjustifiably broad range of events (the target of the insult might 
think “everyone thinks I am a loser”; e.g. Beck, 1970; Craske & Barlow, 2006).  
If self-distancing attenuates biases that are easier for outsiders to see (as 
suggested by the experiments in Chapter 2), then it may also reduce the cognitive biases 
that are partly responsible for the generation of these illnesses with downstream effects 
for well-being, the dependent variable of interest in this experiment. In fact, apart from 
the studies on the correspondence bias, a number of studies in which self-distancing is 
shown to help with the processing of negative emotions could be reinterpreted as 
debiasing studies. Take the two examples of self-distanced thought that Kross and 
Ayduk (2011) provide in their review of their program of research.  
Participant 1: “… All of these underlying currents and frustration led me to be 
irritable and thus sparked the conflict over silly argument…”  
 
Participant 2: “I was able to see the argument more clearly… I initially 
empathized better with myself but then I began to understand how my friend 
felt…” 
 
Kross and Ayduk explain these changes in terms of meaning making, and this makes 
sense in light of their findings—participants sometimes see the events on which they are 
reflecting in a larger context, as related to other things, etc. However the two examples 
that they provide seem to be equally indicative of debiasing. Presumably Participant 1 
did not realize at the time that the argument was silly, instead thinking that her grievance 
was legitimate and pursued the argument with vigor. To the extent that this insight was 
gained in the self-distancing session, the participant was able to overcome her own 
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biased perspective and her own bias toward self-enhancement (e.g., Sedikides & Gregg, 
2008) in order to see the argument as it actually occurred. Similarly, Participant 2 
explicitly says that he now sees “the argument more clearly”, suggesting that his 
previous view of the argument was in some way biased, presumably in a self-enhancing 
manner. This assumption is underscored by his statement that he revised his 
understanding of how his friend felt. Both of these participants overcame their biased 
views of these situations. 
It is important to recognize that meaning-making is orthogonal to debiasing. 
Kross and Ayduk convincingly demonstrated that meaning-making occurs when people 
self-distance. However meaning-making can occur without correcting one’s biased view 
of a situation. For example, Participant 1 could have said, “I was absolutely right in my 
convictions at the time of the argument, and I still believe what I said, but now I can see 
that argument as a stepping stone on my way to becoming a more assertive person, the 
kind of person that I ultimately want to be.” This gives the argument additional meaning 
without admission of any bias in one’s perception of the argument. Conversely, it is 
conceivable that someone could come to see that they were wrong, without lending any 
additional meaning to the event. 
Thus, even in self-distancing experiments that primarily target emotion 
regulation, there may be a debiasing aspect, something that makes sense given the 
demonstration in Chapter 2 that cognitive biases can be reduced through self-distancing. 
Therefore, if self-distancing does have a broad debiasing effect, this effect should extend 
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to the cognitive biases inherent in emotional illnesses with consequent improvements in 
emotional well-being.  
As mentioned above, my colleagues and I have developed a means of creating 
distance from the self by instructing participants to either think or write in the second- 
(i.e., “you”) or third person (i.e., “he” or “she”). For example, imagine a stressed 
undergraduate named Joe who is approaching a deadline on a term paper. If Joe wanted 
to write about his anxiety in the third person, then instead of writing “I am really 
worried…I think I’m never going to finish this,” he would write, “Joe is really 
worried…he thinks he’s never going to finish this.”  
The present study examines whether self-distancing in the form of third-person 
writing can improve well-being outcomes from the use of CBT homework exercises or 
“worry logs”.  
 
Experiment 1 
In this longitudinal study, I invited participants into the lab, they filled out a 
questionnaire, and were randomized into a self-distanced, third-person writing condition 
or a self-immersed, first-person control writing condition (the default way in which these 
logs are usually filled out). They were educated about the purpose of the worry logs, 
given a practice worry log to complete in either the first- or the third person, and given 
an internet link through which they were to fill out one worry log daily at home for six 
days. They were also emailed this link every day as a reminder. On the eighth day, 
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102 University of Michigan undergraduates received course credit for their 
participation.   
Materials 
 The primary measures in this study were the Satisfaction with Life Scale 
(SWLS), the Penn State Worry Questionnaire (PSWQ), the Patient Health Questionnaire 
(PHQ-8), and the Ruminative Response Scale (RRS).  I included the SWLS because, 
although it has high internal consistency, its temporal stability is moderate and it is 
sensitive enough that it can pick up on changes from the beginning to the end of a 
clinical intervention (Diener, Emmons, Larsen, & Griffin, 1985; Pavot & Diener, 1993). 
I expected a greater increase in life satisfaction for the self-distanced than for the 
immersed group. The other three measures are measures of traits or chronic tendencies 
that were used to assess whether individual differences in worry, depression, or 
rumination would moderate the efficacy of the self-distancing intervention.   
SWLS. The five items of this scale (e.g., “In most ways my life is close to my 
ideal”; “If I could live my life over, I would change almost nothing” with response 
options from 1 = strongly disagree to 7 = strongly agree) are intended to tap general life 
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satisfaction. The SWLS shows convergent validity with similar measures of subjective 
well-being (Diener et al., 1985; Pavot & Diener, 1993).   
PSWQ. The 16 items of this scale (e.g., “I never worry about anything”; “Once I 
start worrying, I cannot stop” with response options from 1 = not at all typical to 5 = 
very typical) are used to assess chronic worry.  It has high internal consistency and 
demonstrates good test-retest reliability (Brown, Antony, & Barlow, 1992; Meyer, 
Miller, Metzger, & Borkovec, 1990). Because this is by design a trait measure, in other 
words, a measure of enduring personality characteristics, I did not expect pre-post 
differences on this item. However, I did administer the PSWQ at both time points to 
ensure that this was not the case. 
PHQ-8. The 8-items of this scale ask how often the respondent has experienced 
the symptoms related to depression over the past two weeks (e.g., “Feeling down, 
depressed or hopeless”; “Feeling tired or having little energy” with response options 
from 0 = not at all to 3 = nearly every day). It is employed in the diagnosis of depressive 
disorders. It has been shown to be not only a reliable and valid measure of the severity of 
depression, but also to be diagnostically valid (Kroenke & Spitzer, 2002; Kroenke et al., 
2009; Kroenke, Spitzer, & Williams, 2001).  Because the PHQ is a questionnaire used to 
assess a chronic syndrome, depression , and specifically asks how often participants 
have had specific symptoms over the past two weeks (longer than the course of our 
study), I did not expect differences on this measure. However, I administered the PHQ at 
both time points to ensure that this was not the case. 
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RRS.  The 22 items of this scale describe cognitive responses to a) physical 
symptoms  (e.g., “Think about your feelings of fatigue or achiness”), b) unpleasant 
emotions linked to the self (e.g., “Think about all of your shortcomings, faults, 
mistakes”), or causes/consequences of unpleasant emotions (e.g., “Think, ‘I won’t be 
able to do my job if I don’t snap out of this.’” Respondents are asked whether they 
never, sometimes, often or always engage in the response described by a given item 
when feeling depressed or sad. The RRS is a valid and reliable instrument for assessing 
chronic rumination that has good predictive validity (Lyubomirsky & Nolen-Hoeksema, 
1995; Nolen-Hoeksema, Morrow, & Fredrickson, 1993; Treynor, Gonzalez, & Nolen-
Hoeksema, 2003). The RRS is a questionnaire that targets a chronic personality trait, and 
thus I did not expect differences on this measure. However, I administered the RRS at 
both time points to ensure this was not the case. 
Procedure 
On Day 1 of this eight day study, participants were invited into the lab and 
depending on condition were told: “In this study, we are examining the completion of a 
daily worry log as a means of managing stress and reducing worry and anxiety.  You 
will be asked to fill out a daily worry log every day for the next week in the first [third] 
person, that is, by using the first person pronoun “I” [third person pronouns “he” or 
“she” and your own name].  People report experiencing benefits from filling out a daily 
worry log in the first [third] person.” They were told they would be returning to the lab 
on Day 8.   
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Participants then completed demographic questions as well as the SWLS, PSWQ, 
PHQ-8, and RRS in that order, so that worry, depression, and rumination responses 
would not affect SWLS scores.  
Then participants received a sample worry log completed in either the first- or 
third person depending on condition (see Appendix A) and information about both how 
to fill out the worry log and about its purpose.  A research assistant also explained how 
the worry log should be completed.  The worry log used here was based on a worry log 
in Rygh and Sanderson’s (2004) Treating Generalized Anxiety Disorder with slight 
modifications based on the worry log in Craske and Barlow’s (2006) Mastery of Your 
Anxiety and Worry: Client Workbook that were necessary because of the modality of this 
experiment.   
Participants then filled out a practice worry log on the computer in the lab in 
either the first person or in the third person depending on condition.   
A research assistant then explained that they would receive an email once daily 
containing a link to an online daily worry log on the Qualtrics survey platform. They 
were told to fill out at least one worry log each day for the following six days in a private 
setting where they wouldn’t be distracted, but also encouraged to fill out an additional 
worry log if they noticed an increase in stress at a certain point in the day.  
On Day 8, each participant returned to the lab where they again responded to a 




I excluded the responses of four participants from the analyses: Three 
participants told the experimenters that they had not taken the study seriously and one 
participant received two emails on day one, one with a link to each condition due to 
experimenter error. 98 participants remained.  
Worry logs completed. The number of worry logs completed did not differ 
according to condition (t<1), and did not interact with condition to predict any of the 
results reported below, nor did controlling for this variable influence any of the results 
reported here. 
 Day one to day eight change in life satisfaction.  There were no significant 
differences between the two groups on the measures (i.e., SWLS, PSWQ, PHQ-8, and 
RRS) at baseline (t < 1).   
To assess the effect of self-distancing on change in participant life satisfaction, I 
computed residual change scores by regressing Day 8 life satisfaction scores on Day 1 
life satisfaction scores as well as two other variables whose influence I wanted to control 
for: gender (strongly associated with differences in anxiety) and difficulty in following 
the instructions about the way to write worry logs (see Schwarz, 2012, and the 
discussion above about the way in which difficulty or disfluency can affect judgment). 
As a heuristic, residual change scores can be thought of as indicating how much each 
participant has changed and the direction of that change from Time 1 to Time 2, such 
that positive change scores indicate increases from Time 1 to Time 2 and negative scores 
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indicate decreases from Time 1 to Time 2. Residual change scores, unlike difference 
scores are statistically independent of baseline and thus estimate change as if all 
individuals were on the same level at baseline. 
I then performed a one sample t-test on each condition using the residuals as the 
dependent variable to determine whether the changes in life satisfaction from Day 1 to 
Day 8 differed from zero. Participants who self-distanced while writing the worry sheets 
experienced an increase in life satisfaction (M=.165, SD=.551, t(44)=2.01, p=.051), 
whereas immersed participants did not differ from baseline (M=-.134, SD=.561, 
t(47)=1.65, p=.11). The two conditions also differed from each other, t(91)= 2.59, 
p=.011. Controlling for Day 1 scores on the PSWQ, PHQ-8, and RRS had no effect on 
the results and these measures did not interact with the results.  
Using the same procedure as described above, there were no significant 
differences from Day 1 to Day 8 on the PSWQ, PHQ-8, or RRS, (see Table 1 for 
details). 
Discussion 
This study demonstrated that a very small shift in the way people reflect on 
themselves when processing their worries can have important downstream effects on 
well-being. Namely, as a result of filling out a CBT worry sheet in the third person at 
least once a day, participants in the self-distanced condition experienced an increase in 
life satisfaction, whereas participants in the immersed condition experienced no change 































































































































































































































































 I hypothesized that this effect would be caused at in part by correction of 
irrational thoughts or biases, in other words, those thoughts that these worry sheets are 
explicitly designed to deal with. But I could not test this proposition in the current 
experiment because the nature of these worry sheets gave participants limited room to 
respond. Subsequent experimentation will address this issue (see Chapter 4 for an 
example of such an experiment).   
This study establishes that third-person writing in the context of CBT homework 
interventions can improve outcomes related to well-being. Although this is important for 
CBT itself, it also holds great importance for the multibillion-dollar self-help industry 
(Salerno, 2006). A large number of people engage in such exercises as were examined 
here without the guidance of a therapist. As this experiment represents just such a 
situation, it has direct applicability to self-help forms of writing. 
 Future research might examine third-person writing in varying contexts. 
Virtually all CBT interventions for a wide spectrum of emotional and mental difficulties 
make use of written homework exercises (for examples, see Oxford’s Treatments That 
Work workbook series) as do nonclinical, but very effective programs such as Alcoholics 
Anonymous, Narcotics Anonymous, and the other Anonymous groups.   
Additionally, past research has demonstrated that adopting a self-distanced 
perspective at the same time as asking why an event occurred is most effective for 
productive reflection, as opposed to nonproductive rumination (for a review, see Kross 
& Ayduk, 2011). In this study I wanted to make the smallest possible change to existing 
CBT interventions, however, effectiveness of self-distanced writing might be heightened 
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in future studies by asking participants to self-distance while simultaneously instructing 
them to think about why they were having these troublesome feelings. The worry sheets 
themselves may have served this purpose to some extent by activating reflection through 
the question prompts, but explicitly instructing participants to think about why they have 
these feelings may be even more effective than merely asking participants to complete 
the sheets in the third person.  
 In Chapter 2, asking participants to write in the second person, (i.e., using “you” 
and their own name) resulted in the same debiasing effects as third-person writing. 
However, writing in the second person is easier for people to engage in as, unlike the 
third person, the second person is a way in which people regularly talk to themselves. 
For example, if I were having trouble getting this chapter done, I might say to myself, 
“Come on Ryan, you can do it!” but it would be unlikely that I would say to myself, 
“Come on Ryan, he can do it!” People might be more likely to accept the results of their 
self-distanced thinking if they perceive this process to be easier; as Schwarz and his 
collaborators have shown (for review, see Schwarz, 2004), if thoughts are difficult to 
bring to mind, people may be less likely to believe them than if they are easy to bring to 
mind. If engaging in a self-distancing technique like third-person writing is especially 
difficult for someone, he or she may be less likely to believe the conclusions that come 
from writing in this way. Asking participants to use “you” and their own name may thus 
increase the effectiveness of self-distanced writing. 
 An additional possibility is suggested by research on distancing from positive 
emotions (Verduyn, Van Mechelen, Kross, Chezzi, & Van Bever, 2012). A future CBT 
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homework experiment should have people distance themselves from the irrational 
thoughts, biases, or excessive worries by writing about them in the third person, but then 
write the more adaptive, coping thoughts in the first-person. Whereas it makes sense to 
distance oneself from irrational thoughts, writing alternative rational thoughts in the 
first-person might help people feel a closer connection to those thoughts, and allow them 
to more deeply integrate the new thoughts into their mental life while simultaneously 
holding the old maladaptive thoughts at a distance. This is conceptually similar to past 
studies finding that self-distancing decreases emotional reactivity not only to negative 
emotions but positive emotions as well. If one wishes to cherish or enjoy positive 
emotions, one should refrain from distancing oneself from them (Verduyn et al., 2012). 
In the same way, it may not be helpful or adaptive to distance oneself from rational 











Chapter 4: Self-Distancing Improves Perceived Ability 
to Cope with Difficult Situations 
"People with high assurance in their capabilities in given domains approach difficult tasks as 
challenges to be mastered rather than as threats to be avoided."  
– Albert Bandura (1997, p. 11)  
   
Interpretations of difficult situations as challenges or as threats can have a 
significant impact on physiology, emotional state, and performance. In many tasks that 
frequently arise in modern life, such as taking a test, socializing, contributing to a class 
discussion, or speaking in front of a group, interpretation of such tasks as threats can 
interfere with performance (Blascovich, Mendes, Hunter, Lickel, & Kowai-Bell, 2001; 
Blascovich, Mendes, Hunter, & Salomon, 1999; Jamieson, Mendes, Blackstock, & 
Schmader, 2010; Jamieson, Mendes, & Nock, 2013; Jamieson, Nock, & Mendes, 2012). 
However, these threat interpretations can be changed. This chapter will describe a study 
that demonstrates that self-distancing can change the balance of challenge and threat 
appraisals such that people are more likely to believe that they can cope with a given 
difficult situation when thinking about the situation from a self-distanced perspective. As 
a follow-up to the experiment in Chapter 3, this experiment allows for participant 
responses extensive enough to code, something not possible in Chapter 3. 
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When a situation is encountered that presents a person with a problem, there are 
at least two ways in which the person can perceive the situation: as a challenge or as a 
threat. This process of interpretation is called an appraisal – a person can appraise or 
interpret the situation as being challenging or threatening. It is generally agreed that the 
determination of whether a situation is a challenge or threat results from an assessment 
of the objective nature of the problem in comparison with one’s own abilities to solve, 
confront, or cope with the problem (Blascovich & Tomaka, 1996; Lazarus, 1991; 
Lazarus & Folkman, 1984). For example, Blascovich and Tomaka (1996) suggest that a 
challenge appraisal occurs when people perceive that their personal resources exceed 
situational demands, whereas a threat appraisal occurs when perceived situational 
demands exceed personal resources. Although these appraisals can generally be quick 
and automatic, they can also be changed (Jamieson et al., 2013). This process of 
changing an appraisal is called reappraisal.  
Self-distancing should help people view problematic situations more as 
challenges than as threats for two reasons. First, self-distancing leads people to focus 
less on the concrete and emotionally-arousing aspects of a problematic situation, and 
instead focus more on reconstruing experiences in such a way that they can better “work 
through” their feelings (for a review, see Kross & Ayduk, 2011). In difficult situations, I 
suspect that the concrete, emotionally arousing details of an ongoing concern are exactly 
those elements of the situation that make it more likely that a given person will believe 
that the demands of the situation outweigh his ability to deal with the situation. Because 
self-distancing reduces people’s tendency to focus on such details, I predicted that when 
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reflecting on a situation from a self-distanced perspective, people’s tendency to view the 
situation as a threat would be reduced, and their tendency to believe that the situation is 
one with which they could cope, in other words, a challenge, would be strengthened. 
There is another possible reason why self-distancing may have such an effect. 
The research program behind cognitive behavioral therapy (CBT) has demonstrated that 
numerous cognitive biases play a role in the generation and maintenance of emotional 
disorders. One particularly noxious emotional disorder, generalized anxiety disorder 
(GAD), involves anxious reactions to a whole host of aspects of one’s life. In other 
words, people with GAD perceive multifarious aspects of life to be threatening. 
However, it is not necessary for someone to have GAD to generate persistent biases in 
appraisals of threat. In the discussion, I will make the case that appraisals of threat occur 
more frequently than is warranted, and thus represent biased thinking, something which 
self distancing has been shown to reduce.  
  
Experiment 1 
The purpose of Experiment 1 was to test the hypothesis that self-distancing will allow 
people to interpret troubling situations as challenges as opposed to threats. Past 
experiments have demonstrated that using non-first person pronouns (i.e. second- or 
third-person pronouns) to refer to the self increases felt distance from the self (Kross et 
al., under review). In this experiment, I asked people in the self-distanced condition to 
use non-first-person pronouns (i.e., “you” or “she” or “he”) to refer to the self and then 
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write for as much time as they needed to describe a situation that was an ongoing worry 
for them. Control participants were asked to do the same using first-person pronouns 
(i.e., “I”).  
Methods 
Participants. Participants were 153 “workers” (71 female; Mage = 34.8) on 
Amazon's Mechanical Turk, an online “crowdsourcing” platform through which people 
complete tasks for compensation.  
 
Procedure and materials 
Cover story. Participants were recruited for a study on writing about emotions 
from a certain perspective. 
Baseline emotion. Participants were asked “How do you feel right now?” on a 
sliding scale with two anchors: Very positive and Very negative, which were coded as 0 
and 100 respectively (M = 35.2, SD=20.2).  
Experimental manipulations. Participants in both conditions were told: 
No matter how satisfied people are with their lives, there are times that they worry and experience 
anxiety about things that may go wrong when they interact with other people.  Take a few 
moments right now to think about a specific experience with another person or people that you 
worry about happening to you from time to time. This could be as minor as worrying about a 
friend not calling you back or more serious like giving a speech in front of lots of people. As you 
do this, try to identify a specific experience that makes you feel especially anxious whenever you 
think about it. Although it may be difficult, most people can usually come up with at least one 
potential social event that they worry about. Take your time as you try to do this. 
 
Participants in the self-distanced [first-person] group were told, “We are interested in the 
language people use to understand their feelings. Some people try to understand their 
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feelings by thinking about themselves using their own name and other non-first-person  
pronouns [first-person pronouns] (in other words, using the pronouns “you” or “your” 
and their own names [using the pronoun “I” or “mine”] to think about themselves) 
when engaging in certain activities, so this is one type of thought that we are interested 
in examining. For example, when a person with the name John is doing something, he 
might think: ‘John, you’re thinking that... You are feeling...’ [when doing something, 
someone might think: “I think that... I am feeling ...’].”  
On the next page participants were told, “In order to investigate the effects of this 
type of thinking, we would like you to write (on the following page) about the 
worrisome event you just thought about using non-first person [first-person] pronouns to 
refer to yourself. Use “you” and your own name [the first person pronoun “I”] as much 
as possible as you write about the causes and reasons underlying the thoughts and 
feelings you experience as you think about this worrisome event. Try to understand why 
you’re feeling the way you are as you think about this experience. Why are you having 
the thoughts that you are having? What underlying causes might exist for your worry?” 
Participants were then instructed to take as much time as they needed to write 
about their concern. 
Challenge and threat appraisals. Three independent judges, unaware of the 
experimental hypothesis, rated the essays on the extent to which they reflected threat 
appraisals using a scale from 0 (if no mention of threat) to 3 (if threat is the major theme 
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in the essay. The essay is anchored around feelings of threat and unpreparedness; r’s > 
.467, p’s < .001). The same three judges also rated the essays on the extent to which they 
reflected challenge appraisals, in other words suggestions that the subject actually does 
have the resources to cope with the situation using a scale from 0 (if no statements 
indicating that participants are capable of coping with the event are given) to 3 (if 
statements indicating that participants are capable of coping with the event are a major 
theme in essay. The essay is anchored around statements indicating that participants are 
capable of coping with the event; statements indicating that participants are capable of 
coping with the event constitutes major theme in the essay.; r’s >.883 p < .001). 
In keeping with previous studies (Tomaka, Blascovich, Kelsey, & Leitten, 1993; 
Tomaka, Blascovich, Kibler, & Ernst, 1997; Tomaka & Blascovich, 1994) the challenge 
and threat appraisal variables were combined to yield one index of cognitive appraisal. 
This appraisal index was computed as a ratio of threat appraisals over challenge 
appraisals, and is intended to reflect to what extent the situation in question is appraised 
to be exceeding one’s resources or ability to cope (Blascovich & Tomaka, 1996). As 
mentioned by Tomaka and Blascovich (1996), this ratio is related to Lazarus and 
Folkman’s (1984) theory of stress and fits well with other approaches that view stress as 





Preliminary Analyses. 13 participants were excluded—four participated in a similar 
study before, five wrote a mixture of first- and non-first-person pronouns, and four did 
not follow the condition instructions correctly. 
Challenge and threat appraisals. Threat versus challenge appraisal ratios were 
computed by first taking the mean of the judges’ ratings of threat and adding a constant 
then taking the mean of the judges’ ratings of challenge and adding the same constant. 
Mean threat was then divided by mean challenge resulting in the above-mentioned index 
of cognitive appraisal. This index was analyzed in a one-way analysis of variance 
(ANOVA) with self-distanced versus self-immersed condition as the only between 
subjects variable, while controlling for gender and difficulty of writing in the manner 
instructed (as in Chapter 3) as well as baseline affect. The latter three variables did not 
interact with condition to predict the outcome. As predicted, participants in the self-
distanced condition (M = 2.09, SD = 1.18) exhibited lower threat to challenge ratios than 
participants in the immersed condition (M = 2.94, SD = .79; F(4,139) = 23.59, p < .001, 
d = .85), meaning that self-distancing increased individuals’ perceptions of their abilities 
to cope with the demands of their worrisome situation.  
 Representative examples of this shift include the following participant essay 
from the self-distanced condition:  
Come on, [participant’s first name], your girlfriend's parents will love you. What's not to like 
about you? You treat their daughter with respect and love her so much. You're a great guy. You 
have a lot to be proud of, so there's no need to keep worrying about what her parnts think about 
you. Just be yourself, [participant’s first name]. It's understandly to be nervous, but you can't let it 




This is an example from the immersed condition:  
At a family reunion I have to interact with people I don't see for much of the year. I know I'm not 
doing as well as they expected and I worry what they will think of me. I know that they would 




The results of this experiment demonstrate that self-distancing can increase 
people’s perceptions that they are able to cope with the demands of a difficult situation 
across a wide variety of self-generated social worries. I suggested that self-distancing 
could have such an effect for two reasons.  
First, prior research has demonstrated that self-distancing leads people to focus 
less on the concrete and emotionally relevant details of a problematic situation and more 
on reconstruing such a situation. As the concrete and emotionally relevant details are 
likely the driver of many threat appraisals, reducing focus on these details should reduce 
perceptions of threat and increase peoples’ perception of being able to cope with the 
situation.  
Second, I suggested that perceptions of threat in modern, industrialized societies 
often represent an overreaction to a problematic situation because our threat reactions 
evolved at a time in which a vastly greater number of existential threats existed (e.g., 
Pinker, 2011). In tasks common in modern society, threat appraisals often lead to 
impaired performance, increased bias toward perception of threat cues, increased 
negative affect, and a maladaptive physiological response such that cardiac efficiency 
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decreases, and peripheral vasculature constricts in the expectation of damage or defeat. 
Challenge appraisals, on the other hand, lead to improved performance, reduced bias in 
perception of threat cues, reduced negative affect, and an adaptive physiological 
response such that cardiac efficiency increases and peripheral vasculature dilates  
(Blascovich et al., 2001, 1999; Jamieson et al., 2010, 2013, 2012).  
 For example, Jamieson and colleagues (2010) provided an experimental 
demonstration of the effects of threat appraisals on test-taking. They brought a group of 
perspective GRE test-takers into the lab and told them that signs of physiological arousal 
that result from test-taking predict better performance. This resulted in improvements on 
the quantitative section of the GRE as well as higher scores on the quantitative section of 
the actual GRE one to three months later compared to a group of control participants 
who were not given such information. This begs the question, if threat-associated 
physiological states are damaging to performance, why do they occur? For example, 
controls in the GRE experiment are presumably seeing physiological arousal as a sign of 
a threat, thus impairing their own performance. This hardly seems adaptive—and for our 
current environment it is not. 
 
Why are threat appraisals often biased? Evolution-environment mismatch  
Our physiological responses did not evolve in a modern, industrialized 
environment with vastly lower incidence of violence than our environment of 
evolutionary adaptiveness (Pinker, 2011). The cognitive, emotional, and physiological 
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responses associated with threat appraisals often represent a mismatch between the 
current environment of a modern industrialized society and the hunter-gatherer 
environment in which these responses evolved (e.g., Nesse, 2004). Manifold situations 
exist that people today react to as dangerous threats, when in our current environment 
this is no longer the case.  
One example of this is ostracism. Ostracism has been demonstrated to have a 
number of serious negative emotional and health consequences (for a review, see 
Williams, 2007). Extreme reactions to any indications of ostracism were justified in a 
hunter-gatherer society, in which being ostracized was equivalent to a death sentence. 
For that reason, it would make sense for individuals to be highly vigilant to signs of 
ostracism, and to react to ostracism as a deadly threat. However in our current society, 
the consequences of ostracism have changed dramatically. Despite dramatic 
physiological and emotional responses demonstrated in studies with college students, 
death is no longer an immediate consequence of ostracism. Ostracism has gone from 
being synonymous with death in a hunter-gatherer environment, to virtually never 
resulting in death in a modern, industrialized society.  
In fact, the emotional consequences that originally developed as a way to prevent 
the real world, objective consequence of dying are themselves now the feared 
consequences of ostracism. In this way, interpreting ostracism from a given group as a 
dangerous threat results in a wild overreaction of our mental and physiological selves. 
There is a familiar word for incorrect interpretations of situations and incorrect 
expectations about the future: bias. The vast majority of perceptions of threat in modern 
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industrialized societies represent incorrect interpretations of the danger of the given 
situation, and thus represent bias.  
Should one doubt that our evolutionary development has prepared us for certain 
fears, one only need to think about the fact that snakes and spiders are among the most 
common phobias, even though they are among the very least likely causes of death or 
injury in a modern industrialized society. If fears were based solely on an accurate 
assessments of death and injury, then city-dwelling humans would be chiefly terrified of 
cars. Numerous examples exist of this sort of mismatch in which things that were once 
deadly to us evoke responses that are inappropriate to our current environment, and 
especially detrimental in environments in which any type of complex thinking is 
required. As noted above anxiety and fear regularly impedes performance on complex 
and creative tasks compared to arousal associated with challenge appraisals (e.g., 
Blascovich et al., 1999). 
 Chapter 2 demonstrated that reasoning from a self-distanced perspective—i.e., 
visualizing a negative experience from a “fly on the wall” perspective, in which the self 
becomes an observer of his or her experience—can reduce bias (Bremner, Goldberg, 
Kross, under review). Briefly, I suggest that self-distancing allows people to break 
through their own naïve realism and recognize the biases in their thoughts by reflecting 
on the self as an “other,” thus simulating this process of being a more impartial outside 
observer. 
 This process should also work for challenge and threat appraisals. When people 
are not involved in a situation--i.e., when they are an “outside observer”--they are less 
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emotionally affected by it. Being attacked is generally more frightening than seeing 
someone being attacked (otherwise, many television programs would not exist). In more 
mundane, everyday situations, outside observers are much better at seeing when 
someone immersed in a situation is making “a mountain out of a mole hill.” We have a 
number of common language expressions for this: We say that we “lack perspective” or 
are “too involved” to make an objective decision. Self-Distancing allows people to 
simulate this outside observer within themselves, psychologically stepping outside of 
themselves in order to see their experience as an outside observer would. This should 
allow people to make more objective and realistic estimates of the relative balance of 
danger in the situation compared with their own resources, thus reducing the incidence 
of threat appraisals and increasing the incidence of challenge appraisals. However, this is 
speculative and future research is needed to better explore the debiasing potential of self-
distancing with regard to challenge and threat appraisals. 
 
Implications and future directions   
The results of the current experiment have important implications for increasing 
performance on tasks common in our modern world, improving health, and decreasing 
emotional distress. For example, although cardiovascular reactivity occurs in both 
situations interpreted as challenges and situations interpreted as threats, the full 
physiological profile is rather different. Cardiovascular reactivity resulting from 
challenge states seems to be relatively benign in terms of long-term health, while 
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cardiovascular reactivity resulting from threat interpretations can over time lead to 
cardiovascular disease and other health problems (Blascovich & Tomaka, 1996; 
Jamieson et al., 2013).  
The current results also suggest one way in which self-distancing increased life 
satisfaction in the CBT homework experiment outlined in Chapter 3. Self-Distanced 
participants likely also experienced an increase in their perception of their own ability to 
cope with difficult situations. Further experimentation instructing participants to write 
more extensively on additional CBT homework exercises could demonstrate such an 
effect. 
 In light of these findings, several future directions spring to mind. First, given the 
successful detection of differences in the balance of challenge and threat appraisals in 
these free writing episodes, it should be possible to go back and re-code past self-
distancing experiments for challenge and threat appraisals. In addition, because other 
clinical cognitive biases outlined in the previous chapter, such as overgeneralization, 
should also be more obvious to an outside observer, previous data could be recoded for 
these clinical biases as well. Moreover, every application of writing about one’s thoughts 
that is related to regulating anxiety in some fashion, including virtually all CBT style 
homework exercises, should be improved by having people think or write in a self-
distanced fashion. These results could have a significant effect on shaping the practice of 




Chapter 5: Conclusion 
 
In one of the most influential works of 20th century philosophy, The View from 
Nowhere (1989), Thomas Nagel focuses on the issue of the human ability to switch from 
a more immersed, subjective viewpoint to a more distanced, objective viewpoint. At the 
outset, he claims that the understanding of this interplay is “the most fundamental issue 
about morality, knowledge, freedom, the self, and the relation of the mind to the physical 
world.” One could add the relation of the mind to the social world to this already 
imposing list. I believe that self-distancing, or experiencing oneself as an “other,” is 
what people naturally do when they attempt to take a more distanced, objective 
viewpoint. The research outlined in this dissertation demonstrates how the easily 
adoptable practice of thinking or writing in the second- or third-person can accentuate 
and strengthen the adoption of this viewpoint with significant effects for correcting one’s 
own thoughts, improving one’s well-being, and increasing the perception of one’s ability 
to cope with difficult situations. 
One result of becoming more distanced and, thus, more objective is the 
recognition that the world is not always as it initially appears to us. Thus, we must reject 
naïve realism and recognize, despite the discomfort that this may cause, that our 
thoughts can be biased. In Chapter 2, two experiments demonstrated that self-distancing 
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in the form of second- and third-person writing can reduce cognitive bias, in this case, 
the correspondence bias.  
Gaining distance from one’s thoughts can also help us manage our worries or 
stressful thoughts about difficult situations. In Chapter 3, a longitudinal experiment 
demonstrated that completing CBT homework exercises or “worry sheets” in the third 
person can improve well-being compared to the conventional manner of completing 
these worksheets.  
From a distance, things also may seem less threatening, and our perception of our 
ability to cope with them can increase as fear retreats. In Chapter 4, self-distanced 
writing changed the balance of threat versus challenge appraisals, allowing people to 
strengthen their belief in their ability to cope with a variety of self-generated social 
worries.  
 
Implications and future directions 
In my opinion, the studies outlined here represent a mere scratching of the 
surface with regard to the potential of understanding how people engage in reflection, 
and how such reflection can be potentiated. Some further research is outlined in the 
previous chapters and is not repeated here—instead, just a brief selection of future 
directions is outlined below.  
Because I posit that people are more objective and are more insightful when 
taking on a self-distanced viewpoint, a follow-up to the free writing experiment could 
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examine nonsocial concerns while the same time asking questions about objectivity. 
While it is true that I can code for insight—something that presumes greater 
objectivity—it is certainly worth exploring whether participants also consciously 
experience greater objectivity and greater insight while taking a self-distanced 
perspective. It is well-established that people are not always the best arbiters of their 
own mental processes (Nisbett & Wilson, 1977). If people do feel that they have greater 
objectivity and insight while self-distancing, then this should increase compliance with 
self-distancing interventions, and establish the conscious nature of the processes 
involved. Additionally, responses to questions about objectivity and insight might be one 
way to establish mediation of the debiasing effects presented here. Similarly, participants 
could be asked if they “felt a bit like they were talking about someone else” when 
referring to the self in the second- or third-person. Examining responses to this question 
as a potential mediator would be a useful undertaking, as the experience of “getting 
outside oneself” is the mechanism through which I believe these effects occur. 
Another useful avenue of exploration would be the relation between gaining 
psychological distance from the self and moral judgment. Virtually every philosophical 
examination of morality confronts the question of why (and how) we should go beyond 
our own self-interest and our own perspective in making moral decisions. One of the 
foremost ethicists of the 20
th
 century, R.M. Hare (1982), makes reference to a 
hypothetical ‘ideal observer’ whom he calls “the archangel” and who is freed from the 
lack of impartiality imposed by having a specific human viewpoint. John Rawls (1999) 
talks about a hypothetical “original position” in which citizens are abstracted from their 
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specific desires and biases and through this exercise in impartiality are asked to come to 
a common understanding of rules for a society. Adam Smith in his Theory of Moral 
Sentiments (1759) talks about moral norms arising from the position of an “impartial 
spectator.” This list could go on and on, but the crux of the matter is that abstracting 
ourselves from our idiosyncratic desires and biases is a central theme in moral 
philosophy, and self-distancing may provide a means to address some of these questions 
as well as a practical means for people to make better moral decisions. 
In this vein, it could be asked if it would be better for judges to write their 
verdicts in the third person. Might judges be more apt to recognize their own biases 
when written in the third person? If anyone doubts that judges are moved by influences 
other than rationality and knowledge of the law, one must only turn to the dramatic 
effects recently demonstrated showing that hunger/break times can radically influence 
judges’ opinions (Danziger, Levav, & Avnaim-Pesso, 2011). Self-distancing or third-
person writing would seem to be perfect for this type of situation as judgment and 
decision-making research demonstrates that people pay less attention to their own 
feelings when they are making decisions for others (for a review, see Greifeneder, Bless, 
& Pham, 2011). Thus, feelings of hunger should influence one less if one is thinking 
about oneself as an “other.” This also suggests that third-person thinking or writing 
could be an effective strategy to boost executive function when one is “depleted” by a 
task or a situation (Muraven & Baumeister, 2000). Recent research has shown that 
depletion effects result not from a deficit of glucose as originally suggested, but instead 
as a result of an interpretation of feelings of tiredness (e.g., Job, Dweck, & Walton, 
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2010). Thus, such feelings should play less of a role when one is thinking about oneself 
as an “other.” 
Another future line of research should compare the process of self-distancing 
with those processes examined by construal level theory (CLT). As suggested in Chapter 
2, theoretically one would expect some differences between the two. At a very basic 
level, CLT is a theory about distance from an observer to an observed object. In other 
words, if I am two feet away from someone I may make a different judgment than when 
I am 200 feet away from that person, and this difference in judgment is often 
accentuated with increasing distance. The effects of these gradations of distance contrast 
sharply with the categorical nature of self-distancing. Self-distancing involves a 
categorical change from taking one’s own perspective to attempting to abandon that 
perspective and take on the perspective of an outsider or an “other.” That the self-other 
dichotomy represents an important categorical difference is supported by decades of 
social psychological research. Theoretically, any differences found between judgments 
made about the self versus judgments made about others should be mirrored in making 
judgments about the self versus making judgments about the self from a self-distanced 
perspective.  
This is not to say that self-distancing is a black or white, either/or process. There 
are indeed two theoretical standpoints from which one can think about oneself: one’s 
own position (the default, or immersed position) and the position of an observer (the 
self-distanced position). However, the attempt to take a self-distanced perspective can be 
graded in the sense that it is far from easy to simply adopt the perspective of an outside 
64 
 
observer. One may be able to take this imagined viewpoint for a moment, and then fall 
back into thinking about oneself from an immersed perspective, so the amount of time 
spent in the self-distanced position and the frequency of self-distancing attempts allows 
for gradation. Additionally, one may have difficulty separating oneself from strong 
feelings that one has in the immersed position, so skill in adopting this perspective 
should be another source of gradation in self-distancing. 
 
Concluding comment 
From the experiments related here to the speculations of philosophers through the 
ages, there seems to be no question that while the practice of gaining distance from the 
self is not easy, it is a highly desirable skill to have. The various manipulations 
developed in the program of research on self-distancing provide the tools to explore this 
ability as well as its extensive implications for human thought, feeling, and behavior. 
Given the centrality of the variable of distance from the self to so many domains of 
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